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Besides cognitive skills, non-cognitive skills—social skills in particular—are crucial for
outcomes in various domains of life. The present work describes the design of the
Movigen project, an intervention study with children aged 10–13 years using enhanced
physical education lessons to foster social skills in a playful way. Utilizing a novel
methodological approach various incentivized economic experiments were applied to
test for spillover effects of the intervention on social skills. At three points during
the course of the study individuals participated in a series of incentivized economic
experiments to elicit economic preferences and personality traits. Additional information
about physical activity and free time activities, different psychometric scales, and family
background were elicited with questionnaires. Furthermore, a subset of individuals was
equipped with accelerometers for 7 days to validate the answers on physical activity in
the questionnaire. The data set comprises a treatment group which received enhanced
physical education lessons and a control groupwhich received regular physical education
lessons at school. The comparison of individuals’ decision in the economic experiments
between both groups allows to study the impact of our intervention on social skills.
Keywords: physical education, intervention, economic experiment, social skills, spillover, randomized
controlled trial
INTRODUCTION
Success in various domains of life, e.g., at school or at the workplace, does not only depend
on cognitive skills, but also on non-cognitive skills. In particular, inputs from both realms are
frequently necessary to attain desirable results (Borghans et al., 2008). Whereas, cognitive skills
refer to attributes which can be measured in terms of scores achieved in standardized tests,
non-cognitive skills are more difficult to capture (Heckman and Kautz, 2012; Heckman et al.,
2019). One reason is the difficulty to define the construct precisely in the first place (Duckworth
and Yeager, 2015). A comprehensive overview on aspects which are comprised by the term
non-cognitive skills can be found in, e.g., Farrington et al. (2012) and Gutman and Schoon (2013).
The focus of the presented study design is on social skills which are a subset of non-cognitive skills
and social competencies, respectively. In particular, social skills cover a set of behavioral facets
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which are a crucial determinant for effective interaction with
other people. Notable instances of social skills are cooperation,
interpersonal skills, empathy, assertion, and responsibility
(Farrington et al., 2012; Gutman and Schoon, 2013).
Whereas, requirements at the workplace increasingly
emphasize the importance of non-cognitive skills (Deming,
2017; Bode et al., 2019; see also Weidmann and Deming, 2020),
employers are at the same time concerned with a lack of social
skills in applicants which is detrimental for employability
(European Commission, 2016, 2017). One approach to enhance
social skills are intervention programs. As non-cognitive skills
are especially malleable at young ages, these programs are often
directed toward children and adolescents (see Kautz et al., 2014,
for an overview). The aim of the present study is to convey social
skills in a playful way during purposefully designed physical
education lessons (see Woll et al., 2018, for a description of
the curriculum).
Besides positive effects on health (Warburton et al., 2006;
Reiner et al., 2013; Pedersen and Saltin, 2015), physical activity
and sports participation are often conjectured to improve
outcomes in other domains of life as well. One explanation is
that being involved in an organizational structure, e.g., in a sports
club, yields spillover effects which foster the development of
social skills as individuals have to get along with other individuals
from diverse backgrounds to pursue common goals (Pfeifer and
Cornelißen, 2010; Cabane and Clark, 2015; Felfe et al., 2016).
Causal evidence on the impact of physical activity and sports
participation on the development of social skills is, however,
scarce (Pawlowski et al., 2018). Yet, the meta-study by Schüller
and Demetriou (2018) finds positive effects of sports-related
interventions at schools using randomized controlled trials on
social skills of children and adolescents for the vast majority of
the underlying studies.
For the purpose of this study we developed a novel
methodological approach. To investigate the impact of our
intervention and to assess potential spillover effects, individuals’
social skills were measured at three different times. This is done
by a series of well-established economic experiments. These
experiments employ an incentive-compatible reward structure
based on the individuals’ decisions (and decisions of their class
mates in some instances) in various economic environments
which induce participants to reveal their true preferences.
Whereas, responses on batteries of self-reported questions may
be subject to individual biases due to different readings of the
underlying scales, the current approach uses an objective scale
provided all participants value monetary payoffs in the same
way (Golsteyn and Schildberg-Hörisch, 2017; see also Heckman
et al., 2019). To our best knowledge, there are no previous studies
using a comparable approach to test for spillover effects of a
sports-related intervention on other domains of life utilizing
incentivized economic experiments.
OUTLINE OF THE STUDY
Participants and Allocation
Students at four different upper secondary schools in Karlsruhe
(Germany) participated in the study. In total, students attending
eight different classes of the sixth grade participated in the study.
To assess the impact of the intervention on students’ personal
and social skills, a randomized controlled trial employing a
treatment and a control group was necessary. This allows to
disentangle the effect of the intervention from other influences
outside the control of this study as the latter can be assumed
to affect students in the treatment and the control group in the
same way. At each school, one class was, therefore, randomly
allocated to the treatment and control group, respectively. Due
to fairness concerns, we offered the classes of the control group
to receive enhanced physical education lessons as conducted
during the intervention in the treatment group after the end of
the study.
To be eligible for participation, parental consent in written
form was mandatory. Therefore, we distributed letters inviting
their children to participate in a scientific study during regular
lessons to the parents via the respective schools. No information
about the purpose of the study was disclosed, neither to the
parents nor to the teachers. Furthermore, the superintendent of
the local school district (ref.-no. 71 c2-6499.25) and the Board
of Ethics of the Karlsruhe Institute of Technology approved
the study.
One hundred and Sixty-six of the 197 students attending the
classes under study (84.3%) returned the consent form and were,
thus, allowed to participate in the study. Due to absence in one
or more parts of the study, data are not complete for some
individuals. Hence, the final data set contains observations on
111 individuals aged 10–13 years (mean: 11.7 years, standard
deviation: 0.44 years). Table 1 provides an overview on the
distribution female and male individuals in the respective groups
who participated in all parts of the study.
Set-Up
Figure 1 presents an outline of the study. Individuals participated
in three measurements to elicit social skills in a series of
different economic experiments during the course of the
study. Repeated measurements were necessary to study both,
individuals’ immediate responses to the intervention as well
as long-term effects. This information is complemented with
data from questionnaires on free time activities (DIW/SOEP,
2015c) and engagement in physical activities (Schmidt et al.,
2016) as well as several psychometric scales such as the Big
Five inventory (Weinhardt and Schupp, 2011), social self-
efficacy, self-efficacy of working in a team, perspective-taking
(Jerusalem et al., 2009), rivalry (Eder, 1998; see also Kunter
et al., 2002), and understanding of democracy (Abs et al.,
2007). These psychometric scales were included to control
for impacts of the intervention on individuals’ personalities
which has been proposed in the literature (e.g., Schmidt and
Conzelmann, 2011). Questionnaires for individuals participating
in the study were distributed after each measurement and were
answered at home. Parents also answered a questionnaire after
the first measurement to provide additional information about
their children, characteristics of the household, and their own
educational background (based upon DIW/SOEP, 2015a,b). At
one school, individuals in the treatment and control group wore
accelerometers for 7 days after the first measurement to collect
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FIGURE 1 | Study set-up.
data about their overall physical activity in order to validate the
corresponding answers in the questionnaire.
Intervention
Individuals of the treatment group participated in an
intervention for a period of 6 weeks between the first and
second measurement. The intervention took place during
regular physical education lessons and had been designed to
enrich the curriculum with a novel concept which conveys
social skills in a playful way. Students participated in one lesson
per week. Topics of the intervention were cooperation and
willingness to work in a team, formal and informal fairness,
self-assessment, and conflict resolution with one specific topic
being covered in each lesson. To put individuals in situations
which require them to actively work on solutions, the main
part of each lesson consisted of physical activities related to the
respective topic of a lesson. To foster the transfer of social skills
to situations in their everyday lives, students were encouraged to
share their experiences and impressions during the first and final
10min of each lesson. Note that the social skills elicited in the
incentivized economic experiments and the topics covered in the
intervention are only loosely related. This is a deliberate decision
in the design of the present study since it is not its purpose to
teach particular behavioral patterns. In fact, the goal is to provide
a playful environment which encourages individuals to develop
skills which enable them to solve challenges in various domains
of life on their own.
Lessons were conducted by university students of sports
science and physical education who had experience in instructing
children and adolescents in sports classes. They had received
additional training prior to conducting the intervention, but were
otherwise not aware of the purpose of this study. Woll et al.
(2018) contains a description of the intervention in more detail.
For a period of 6 weeks, classes which had been assigned to the
treatment group received one lesson per week. Each lesson had
been outlined for a slot of 80 min:
• The first 15min (approximately) were used for a warm-up to
prevent injuries.
• After that, the topic of the specific lesson was introduced to the
class (approximately 8min). Students were asked to contribute
own experiences related to the respective topic to establish a
common understanding.
• The main part of the lesson (approximately 50min) addressed
the respective topic utilizing a playful approach. Therefore,
the topic of a lesson was presented in a sports-related
context, e.g., in terms of an additional rule imposed on
a game which required the students’ consideration. To
achieve a transmission beyond the setting of the intervention,
students were encouraged to actively develop a way to
deal with this kind of constraint within their classes.
It is important to note that—although the intervention
is designed to supplement regular physical education
lessons—the goal of this study is not to promote physical
activity in the first place. Rather, the specific setting of
physical education lessons provides an environment
which allows to pursue a playful approach to foster
social skills as students receive instantaneous feedback
from their peers which enables them to adapt their
behavior accordingly.
• Each lesson was concluded by a short period of
reflection (approximately 7min) in which students
had the opportunity to share their impressions and
take private notes in a diary which had been handed
out upfront.
Moreover, the design of the intervention took particular
consideration to establish an environment which promotes the
acquisition of new behaviors and their transmission beyond the
setting of the intervention. As one element of the intervention
was the development of own solution concepts by students,
instructors were told to monitor their classes during the main
part of each lesson but not to intervene unless to prevent injuries
or turmoil. Feedback was another important parameter. Students
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TABLE 1 | Number of individuals by group and gender.
Female Male Total
Control 27 (44%) 35 (56%) 62
Treatment 25 (51%) 24 (49%) 49
52 (47%) 59 (53%) 111
were, therefore, instructed to provide each other non-judgmental
feedback based on their behavior in specific situations and
suggestions for future improvements—or appreciation.
EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN
As mentioned above, a wide range of individual behaviors
is summarized under the umbrella term social skills which
are not trivial to measure. Whereas, this term is not used
uniformly across different disciplines, we take reference to the
understanding proposed in behavioral economics and economic
psychology, respectively, where social skills comprise—among
others—economic preferences and other determinants which are
crucial for various life outcomes (Humphreys and Kosse, 2017).
This enables us to build on a range of incentivized tasks which
allow to draw inferences on underlying preference parameters
(Ertac, 2020). To elicit individual preferences and traits in
different economic environments we used a series of economic
experiments. To establish an incentive-compatible setting for the
elicitation of social skills, one experiment was selected for payout
at the end of each measurement (see section Procedures).
Table 2 provides an overview of preferences and traits which
are of particular interest in context of the present study as well as
the corresponding economic experiments used for elicitation and
the outcome variables of interest. Moreover, this section provides
an overview on predictions of individuals’ behavior in the
economic experiments. A comprehensive overview on children’s
decisions in different economic experiments is provided by Sutter
et al. (2019).
Ultimatum and Dictator Game
The ultimatum game (Güth et al., 1982; Güth and Kocher,
2014) depicts a bargaining situation between two individuals,
sender and receiver. To elicit a complete strategy profile for
each individual, we employ the strategy method (Selten, 1967).
In the first stage, all individuals make their individual decision
in the role of the sender. They are endowed with 600 tokens
each and have to decide which fraction x ǫ {0, 120, 300, 480,
600} they pass to the receiver who is one randomly selected
individual of the same class. The remaining 600 – x tokens are
kept by the sender. In the second stage, all individuals decide
individually for each potential offer x a sender can make whether
or not they want to accept this offer. If this experiment is chosen
for payment, two individuals are randomly matched who are
assigned the role of the sender and receiver, respectively. If
the receiver chose “accept” for the respective sender’s offer, the
receiver receives x tokens and the sender receives 600 – x tokens.






Amount passed to the
receiver (ratio scale)
Dictator game Amount passed to the
receiver (ratio scale)
Negative reciprocity Ultimatum game
(receiver)
Negatively reciprocal if
positive offer is rejected
(binary scale)
Cooperation Public good game Amount contributed to the
collective account (ratio
scale)





Time preferences Piggy bank Patient if delayed
gratification is chosen
(binary scale)
Honesty Mind game Honesty on aggregate level
if share of matching
numbers does not exceed
1/6 (binary scale)












Overconfident if result falls




Overconfident if threshold of
chosen difficulty level is not
achieved (binary scale)
* Operationalized using the encryption task.
If the receiver chose “not accept,” both individuals receive a payoff
of zero tokens.
The ultimatum game employs a sequential structure. Thus,
backward induction is used to derive predictions for both, the
sender and the receiver. In the second stage, the receiver has to
decide for each potential offer x the sender can make whether
she wants to accept the offer or not. A selfish receiver who
maximizes her own payoff accepts any positive offer. Thus, the
sender offers the smallest positive amount, i.e., 120 tokens, while
keeping the remaining 480 tokens for herself—and the receiver
accepts. The dictator game, in contrast, does not incorporate any
decision by the receiver. Hence, the sender will pass the smallest
possible amount, i.e., 0 tokens, to the receiver and keep the entire
endowment of 600 tokens for herself (Hoffman et al., 2008).
The dictator game is a modification of the ultimatum game
(Forsythe et al., 1994). Again, individuals are endowed with 600
tokens. They decide which fraction x ǫ {0, 120, 300, 480, 600}
they pass to the receiver while keeping the remaining 600 – x
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tokens. Unlike in the ultimatum game, the receiver cannot reject
the allocation of the sender. Moreover, the receiver in this setting
is not another individual of the same class. Instead, tokens sent
to the receiver are donated to a charity which supports children
and their families in developing countries if this experiment is
selected for payment.
In contrast to standard theoretical predictions, offers between
40 and 50% of the initial budget by senders are commonly
observed in ultimatum games. Receivers regularly accept these
offers. As offers decline, rejection rates increase—in particular
for offers below 20% of the initial budget which are rejected in
most of the cases (Camerer, 2003). With a share of about 30% of
the initial budget which is passed to the recipient in the dictator
game the amount ranges below the frequently observed offers
in the ultimatum game. In particular, a substantial fraction of
more than one-third of dictators decide to keep the entire budget
(Engel, 2011). On the majority, fifth-graders aged 10–11 years
in the study of Angerer et al. (2015) pass one to three tokens
of an endowment of six tokens to a charity. Only 13% of the
individuals keep their entire endowments and a fraction of<10%
of the individuals passes more than half of their endowments to
the charity.
A positive amount passed to the receiver in the ultimatum and
dictator game reflects the sender’s unconditional and conditional
altruism, respectively. More precisely, the amount passed to the
receiver is a measure for the extent of the sender’s unconditional
and conditional altruism. A receiver in the ultimatum game who
rejects a positive amount offered by the sender is demonstrates
negatively reciprocal behavior.
Prisoner’s Dilemma and Public Good Game
The prisoner’s dilemma is a two-player experiment which
constitutes a social dilemma (Roth, 1995). Each individual can
choose between two strategies, “Cooperate” and “Defect.” The
payoffmatrix is depicted in Figure 2. To elicit a complete strategy
profile for each individual, we use the strategy method. In the
first stage, each individual decides independently whether she
wants to cooperate or defect. In the second stage, individuals face
the same decision contingent on the other individual’s possible
decision to (i) cooperate and (ii) defect. If the experiment is
selected for payment, two individuals of a class are randomly
matched. Within each group, one individual is randomly selected
whose independent decision is relevant for payoff. For the other
player, the corresponding dependent decision is evaluated. Both
individuals’ payoffs are denoted by the values of the resulting cell
of the payoff matrix.
The public good game is closely related to the prisoner’s
dilemma as it constitutes a social dilemma in groups with two
or more individuals (Ledyard, 1995; Roth, 1995; Cipriani et al.,
2013). Individuals are endowed with 120 tokens and form a
group with three other randomly selected individuals of the
same class. They can allocate their endowment to a private or
a public account in intervals of 24 tokens. If the experiment
is selected for payment, the number of tokens allocated to the
collective account by all individuals of the group is totaled. Each
individual receives a return of 1 token for every token contributed
to the collective account—nomatter by whom. Additionally, each
individual receives a return of 2 tokens for every token allocated
to her private account. Thus, the payoff πi of individual i is
given by
πi = 2(120− ci)+ (c1 + c2 + c3 + c4),
where ci ǫ {0, 120, 300, 480, 600} is individual i’s contribution to
the collective account as multiple of 24 tokens. The marginal per-
capita return (MPCR) is 0.5, i.e., every token contributed to the
collective account by an individual herself yields a return which is
half the quantum of the return from a contribution of one token
to her private account.
Using the strategy method in the prisoner’s dilemma allows to
identify three types of contributors (similar to Fischbacher et al.,
2001). Individuals who always cooperate or defect, irrespectively
of the other individual’s decision (“always cooperate” and “never
cooperate,” respectively) and “conditional cooperators” who
cooperate if the other individual does so and vice versa if the
other individual defects. In the public good game, the amount
of tokens contributed to the collective account indicates the
individual level of cooperativeness.
Lottery
The lottery consists of two experiments (conceptually similar
to Deckers et al., 2017; see also Castillo et al., 2018). In
each experiment, individuals choose between two envelopes. In
the first experiment, envelope A contains six green cards and
envelope B contains three red cards and three blue cards. If this
experiment is selected for payment, a card is drawn from each
envelope A and B. An individual who chose envelope A receives
200 tokens if a green card is drawn (probability: 100%). An
individual who chose envelope B receives 600 tokens if a red card
is drawn (probability: 50%) and zero tokens if a blue card is drawn
(probability: 50%). The second experiment is identical to the first
except the names of the envelopes and the colors of the cards:
Envelope C contains six orange cards and envelope D contains
three purple cards and three yellow cards. If this experiment
is selected for payment, an individual who chose envelope C
receives 400 tokens if an orange card is drawn (probability:
100%). An individual who chose envelope D receives 600 tokens
if a purple card is drawn (probability: 50%) and zero tokens if a
yellow card is drawn (probability: 50%).
Envelopes A and C represent degenerate lotteries with a sure
payoff of 200 tokens and 400 tokens, respectively. Envelopes B
and D represent the same non-degenerate lottery L = (0.5◦600,
0.5◦0) with an expected payoff E[L] = 300 tokens. An individual
who chooses the lottery (envelope B) in the first experiment
(E[L] > 200) and the sure option (envelope C) in the second
experiment (400 > E[L]) is labeled risk-neutral. Similarly, an
individual who always chooses the sure payoff (envelopes A
and C) or the lottery (envelopes B and D) is labeled risk-averse
or risk-seeking, respectively. In a comparable setting, Deckers
et al. (2017) identify about 44% of children aged 7–9 years
in their sample as risk-neutral. While this is independent of
their socio-economic status, children from households with high
socio-economic status are less often risk-seeking and more often
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FIGURE 2 | Prisoner’s dilemma. T (Temptation) > R (Reward) > P (Punishment) > S (Sucker’s payoff) and 2R > T + S.
risk-averse than their counterparts from households with low
socio-economic status.
Encryption Task
In a real-effort task adopted from Erkal et al. (2011) individuals
have to replace letters of a given word. The difficulty of the task
increases in the number of iterations which are required for the
encryption. For the one-fold encryption, the letters of the original
word have to be replaced once by another letter from a given
table. The two-fold variant requires an additional step, i.e., the
letters of the original word have to be replaced in two subsequent
steps according to two different given tables, and so forth. The
number of correctly encrypted letters in a 2-min working period
is the outcome variable of interest. The task is employed in three
different experiments with a specific payoff structure each:
(1) At the beginning of this experiment, individuals can
familiarize with the task during a trial period of 30 s in
which they are asked to apply a two-fold encryption on a
word with five letters. The main part also requires two-fold
encryption. Before they start working, individuals give an
estimate about their performance in the main part relative
to the performance of the other individuals of their class, i.e.,
they indicate whether they expect themselves to be among
the top, middle, or lower third (Almås et al., 2016). If this
experiment is selected for payment, a correct estimation
yields 300 tokens while an incorrect estimation results in
a payoff of zero tokens. Additionally, individuals receive
3 tokens for each correctly encrypted letter with a cap at
300 tokens.
(2) In this setting, individuals work again on the two-fold
encryption with different replacement tables. Before they
start working, individuals can choose whether they prefer
a piece-rate or a payment based on a tournament scheme
(Niederle and Vesterlund, 2007; Booth and Nolen, 2012;
Samak, 2013; Almås et al., 2016). The piece-rate is 3 tokens
for every correctly encrypted letter with a cap at 300 tokens,
whereas the tournament scheme comprises a loser prize
of zero tokens and a winner prize of 600 tokens. An
individual who chose the tournament scheme receives the
winner prize if this experiment is selected for payoff if she
obtained a higher output than another randomly chosen
individual of the same class. If the individual under question
obtained a lower output, she receives the loser prize. Ties are
broken randomly.
TABLE 3 | Payoff by level of task difficulty in the encryption task.
Task difficulty Piece-rate Threshold Cap
One-fold encryption 1 token 5 letters 100 tokens
Two-fold encryption 3 tokens 15 letters 300 tokens
Three-fold encryption 10 tokens 35 letters 1,000 tokens
(3) In this variant, individuals can choose between three
different levels of task difficulty (similar to Falk et al.,
2015)1 which require one-, two-, and three-fold encryption,
respectively. If this experiment is selected for payment,
the remuneration depends on the level of task difficulty
according to Table 3. For each level of task difficulty,
the payoff is contingent on a threshold which specifies a
minimum number of letters which have to be encrypted
correctly. At the same time, the maximum amount of
tokens which can be achieved is capped for each level of
task difficulty.
The specific payment schemes in the encryption task relate
to different personality traits. The first and the third variant
are concerned with relative and absolute self-assessment,
respectively. These personality traits refer to individuals’ ability to
estimate their own performance accurately in comparison to their
peers or in absolute terms. Individuals who expect themselves
to perform better in the relative ranking of their class than they
actually do are deemed overconfident. Similarly, individuals who
do not achieve the minimum number of correctly encrypted
letters required under the level of task difficulty of their choice
fall into the same category. Falk et al.1 find 37% of the children
in their sample with an average age of 8 years to be overconfident
prior to their intervention.
The choice between two compensation schemes either based
on an individual’s absolute performance or on her relative
performance compared to another randomly selected individual
of the same class is an indicator for individuals’ competitiveness.
More precisely, competitive individuals choose the tournament-
based compensation scheme. The seminal paper by Niederle
and Vesterlund (2007) reports that male individuals are more
competitive than females as three quarter of men and one-
third of women prefer the tournament scheme. This gender
1Falk, A., Kosse, F., and Schildberg-Hörisch, H. (2015). Reducing Overconfidence.
Unpublished manuscript.
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gap also occurs among children, although its magnitude is less
pronounced (e.g., Almås et al., 2016).
Mind Game
In the mind game (Jiang, 2013; see also Kajackaite and Gneezy,
2017; Abeler et al., 2019), individuals are first asked to imagine
an integer number between one and six. After that, they receive
an envelope each. The envelope contains a set six cards with one
number from one to six printed on each card. Individuals are
then asked to draw one card from the envelope and to indicate
whether the number on the drawn card matches the integer they
had imagined before. If this experiment is selected for payment,
individuals who reported a match between the imagined and the
drawn number receive 600 tokens and zero tokens otherwise.
The mind game addresses dishonesty. The experiment
deliberately does not allow to derive conclusions whether
an individual who reported matching numbers was actually
dishonest or not. On the aggregate level, however, the fraction of
individuals who report matching numbers is expected to be 1/6 in
a sufficiently large sample. Hence, a share of matching numbers
reported which exceeds 1/6 indicates dishonest behavior on an
aggregate level. In a similar setting in which children aged 5–15
years in Italy received a payment conditional on the outcome
of a fair coin toss, about 85% of the individuals reported an
outcome which entitled to receive the payment. This fraction was
substantially higher than the theoretical share of 50% (Bucciol
and Piovesan, 2011).
Piggy Bank
This experiment offers the choice between two alternatives which
differ in the amount of the payoff and its date (Bauer et al., 2014;
Angerer et al., 2015; Deckers et al., 2017). If the experiment is
selected for payoff, individuals who chose the first alternative
receive 300 tokens on the same day, whereas individuals who
opted for the second alternative receive 600 tokens with a delay
of 1 week.
The decision in the piggy bank experiment measures time
preferences. Individuals who trade off an earlier gratification for
a higher payoff exhibit a low discounting rate and are deemed
patient. In a similar setting, 63% of the children between 4 and 12
years (average age about 8 years) who participated in a study in
the Czech Republic chose the higher payoff with a delay of 1 week
(Bauer et al., 2014).
Procedures
As described in section Set-Up, individuals participated at three
times during the course of the study in a measurement using a
series of standard economic experiments to elicit different social
skills. Measurements took place in classrooms during regular
lessons and were conducted by students of different fields of
study who were pursuing a university degree which qualifies for
teaching at upper secondary schools; they were not aware of the
purpose of this study.
To identify individuals across different stages of the study
while maintaining anonymity, they received a card with their
ID number at the beginning of each measurement from
their teacher. Individuals’ identities were not disclosed to the
experimenters. During the measurements, individuals were
allocated in the classroom such that they were able to make
their decisions independently and without being disturbed.
General instructions were read aloud before the first experiment.
After clarifying questions about the general procedure had been
answered, individuals received the answer sheet for the first
experiment. The experimenter ensured that each individual
received an answer sheet with the correct ID number. Answer
sheets contained a description of the experiment, in particular
the choice set and related consequences for the payoff, and
space to write down the decision. Instructions were read aloud
by the experimenter. Individuals did not write down their
decisions before all clarifying questions had been answered. The
subsequent experiments followed the same procedure and were
standardized. For a detailed description of each experiment, see
Supplementary Material.
To choose the experiment which was relevant for payoff,
the teacher was asked to open an envelope which contained
a card stating the number of the experiment. The payoff of
each individual in the corresponding experiment was calculated
and converted into Euro. The exchange rate rate was 75 tokens
= 1.00 Euro. Individuals received an additional participation
fee of 2.00 Euro per session. Payoffs were handed out to each
individual in sealed envelopes by the teacher in exchange for
the ID card. We ensured that the maximum possible payoff
per session was 10.00 Euro which corresponds to approximately
50% of the recommended monthly amount of pocket money
for children aged 11–12 years in Germany (Langmeyer and
Winklhofer, 2014). The average individual payoff per session was
6.27 Euro.
STATISTICAL ANALYSIS
The primary interest of this research is on differences in decisions
between the treatment and control group in various economic
experiments. As data gathered in economic experiments are
rarely normally distributed, we rely on non-parametric tests
in the first place. The appropriate-ness of a hypothesis test
depends on the level of measurement of our outcome variables
(Stevens, 1946). When dealing with categorical or binary data,
a χ2-test for independence is applied, whereas the Mann-
Whitney U-test is the choice for ratio data. As hypothesis
tests only draw an incomplete picture and have been subject
to severe criticism recently (e.g., Büsch and Strauß, 2016;
Calin-Jageman and Cumming, 2019), we additionally calculate
effect sizes (Cramér’s V and the correlation coefficient r;
see Tomczak and Tomczak, 2014) and the corresponding
confidence intervals to provide insights on the magnitude
of the actual differences between the treatment and the
control group.
Beyond plain comparisons between the treatment and control
group, we are interested in the causal effect of the intervention
on decisions in the economic experiments. The panel structure
of the data set allows to address this question using regression
analyses. As repeated measurements are not independent, a
random effects-model is employed. This allows to control for
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time-constant independent variables such as gender and socio-
economic status (Andreß et al., 2013). To account for correlation
within classes, standard errors are clustered.
SUMMARY
The aim of the study design is to investigate the impact of
physical activity and sports participation on social skills using
purposefully designed physical education lessons. To test for
intervention effects, we utilized a novel approach in this field by
applying various incentivized standard economic experiments.
To contribute to the existing literature, we designed theMovigen
(Latin: motio—motion; genitor—creator) project to address two
research questions:
(1) Are different levels of physical activity associated with
different outcomes regarding social skills?
(2) Is the intervention using a novel concept for physical
education effective in enhancing social skills?
The first question is motivated by the discussion whether
sports participation can be considered as investment good. The
rationale is that sports participation may not just invoke pleasure
but also foster skills which are assumed to translate into favorable
outcomes in other domains of life, e.g., success in the labor
market (Leeds, 2015). In the present study, this issue can be
addressed with data from the first measurement, i.e., before
the beginning of the intervention in the treatment group by
a comparison of differences in individuals’ decisions in the
economic experiments contingent on their levels of physical
activity. This approach is, however, not appropriate to draw
causal conclusions on the relation between the intensity of sports
participation and social skills as factors which may affect both
domains simultaneously, e.g., due to selection effects, are not
explicitly incorporated.
Having a treatment and control group, however, does allow
to examine the causal effect of the intervention on decisions in
the economic experiments. Due to the repeated measurements
in both groups, we are able to disentangle the effect of
the intervention on individuals in the treatment group from
experience effects which occur if the same series of economics
experiments is repeated. Moreover, our design employs an active
approach of learning and encourages individuals to develop skills
which enable them to solve challenges in various domains of
life on their own. This method is expected to be more effective
in inducing changes in behavior as compared to approaches
which already provide the solution to attain the desired outcome
(Durlak et al., 2010). To our best knowledge, there are no
previous studies using a comparable approach to test for
spillover effects of a sports-related intervention on other domains
of life.
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